The relationship between thought and action in sacrfices

Very initial thoughts - don't hold me to anything

I’ve just started learning Masechet Menachot (the tractate of the Talmud, which deals with the grain offerings (singular: mincha, plural: menachot) brought in the Temple), and I wanted to write about what is on literally the first page. On page 2b, there is a disagreement between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis about if a wrong intent when bringing a mincha invalidates the sacrifice. Specifically, the faulty thought is if you decided you were bringing a different offering than the one you are bringing. For example, if you decided that you were bringing an offering made in a shallow pan, it is actually an offering made in a deep pan. Or if you decided you are bringing a mincha mixed with oil, but actually, it isn’t mixed with oil. The rabbis assert that this change in intent invalidates the offering, as such a change from the actual offering being brought would invalidate any sacrifice (for example, if you slaughtered a sin offering thinking it was a peace offering). Rabbi Shimon thinks that menachot are distinct from sacrificed animals (singular: zevach, plural: zevachim), as each mincha is unique in the way it looks and the actual action required (crumbling a thin cracker is very distinct from crushing a thicker cake), whereas animals are all sacrificed using the same steps (slaughter, catching the blood, and throwing it on the altar).

Seemingly the simplest explanation of Rabbi Shimon’s opinion here is that the thought actually defines the action, and with menachot this isn’t really necessary. They have enough definition because of the way they look anyway. Of course, this raises two obvious questions:

• According to Rabbi Shimon, what is the role of the intent in sacrifices in general? Is it purely to define the act and therefore sometimes is not necessary, or is it that the actions in menachot are so apparent that intent is assumed?

• Why do the rabbis disagree? Do they think that intent is always necessary axiologically, or do they think that menachot are not as obviously revealing of intent as Rabbi Shimon?

This also raises the question of other necessary issues of intent in sacrifices. Are they as necessary as thinking about the correct type of sacrifice? For example, thinking about bringing this sacrifice on account of someone who is not the person who has brought it to the Temple: does this invalidate the sacrifice? It is necessary for the kohen bringing the sacrifice to keep the owner of the sacrifice in mind. What if he thinks of someone else?

---

Most authorities assume that the same rule will apply here when thinking about the type of sacrifice. However, the Mishne Lemelech on Hilchot Pesulei Hamukdashin (Laws of invalid sacrifices) 15, 1 says that only throwing the blood on the altar while thinking of a different owner is something that will invalidate the sacrifice. Given that there are four crucial actions to be completed with every zevach (slaughter, catching the blood, bringing it to the altar, and throwing it on the altar) and four crucial parallel actions in menachot (kemitza - separating a small part of the mincha in a three-fingered fist, placing it in a vessel, bring the vessel to the Temple, and burning the kometz - part grabbed in the fist), the burning of the kometz would presumably be the only part where thinking of a new owner would invalidate the mincha.

The Mishne Lemelech gets this idea from the way that the requirement to think of the correct owner is derived from the Torah. The Torah says that kohen will “atone for him.” The Talmud derives that the atonement should be intended for that person. The main point of atonement is the throwing of blood on the altar. As such, it makes sense that this would be the point that thinking of a different owner would be a severe problem. This suggests that he thinks the requirement to think of the owner is a way of relating the sacrifice to the owner, or at least the act of atonement inherent in the sacrifcie. Those who disagree presumably think that, once again, it is about defining the zevach or mincha as belonging to that person, Not necessarily about relating a specific action that is part of the sacrificial process to that person. It should be noted that the Mishne Lemelec also raises the possibility that thinking of throwing on behalf of someone else while you perform the act of slaughter would also invalidate the sacrifice, but just thinking about a different owner while performing the slaughter would not.