Understanding the prohibition of chametz on Pesach
How should we understand the prohibition on owning chametz on Pesach?
Every Pesach, we obsess over cleaning our homes of chametz (leavened foods made from wheat, barley, rye, oats, or spelt). Such food is prohibited at a Torah level. Since the prohibition concerns food, we often view it as an extension of kashrut for one week, but it is more than that. On Pesach, we do not just refrain from eating chametz; we reject it entirely, removing it from our lives by destroying it or selling it to a non-Jew.
But what exactly are we trying to avoid? Is the prohibition about what we own, or what is physically in our house? The answer is a fascinating three-way dispute among the Rishonim.
The Biblical Foundation
During the holiday, we tend to focus on more positive acts, centred on eating matzah, which, of course, is the opposite of chametz. However, before we begin to focus on the positive side of the holiday, we must first sever any connection to chametz in our lives. The Torah gives us four commands relating to the destruction of chametz. Two are positive, relating to the actual destruction of the chametz. Two are negative and relate to what counts as a connection to the chametz:
For seven days, leaven shall not be found in your houses. All who eat that which is leavened, that person shall be cut off from the congregation of Israel, whether a sojourner or native of the land. (Shemot 12:19)
Unleavened bread shall be eaten for the seven days; and no leavened bread shall be seen with you, and no leaven shall be seen with you in all your borders. (Shemot 13:7)
Building on these verses, the Gemara (Pesachim 5b) explores whether the two prohibitions address different situations regarding chametz. For example, perhaps the prohibition against seeing chametz refers to any chametz you own, while the prohibition against finding chametz pertains only to that which is physically in your possession. The Gemara ultimately rejects this distinction:
Just as concerning the leaven stated about borders, your own leaven you may not see. Still, you may see leaven that belongs to others (Rashi - gentiles), and leaven consecrated to God (and thus forbidden from consumption), so too, concerning the leaven stated about houses: Your own leaven you may not see, but you may see leaven that belongs to others and leaven consecrated to God. (BT Pesachim 5b)
This gemara explicitly states that the location of chametz doesn’t change the importance of ownership. Many ruled in accordance with the gemara’s simple meaning. For example, the Rambam:
…you can learn that chametz belonging to a Jew which was left in his possession, even though it is buried, is located in another city, or is entrusted to a gentile, causes him to violate [the commandments]: “[leaven] shall not be seen” and “[leaven] shall not be found.” (Rambam Chametz uMatzah 4:2)
The Core Debate: Ownership vs. Location
However, are there other parts of the prohibition? Are there other tracks to violate the prohibition of finding or seeing chametz? The Mechilta DeRashbi, quoted in the Torah Shleimah, raises this possibility:
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: was not “you shall not find” contained within “you shall not see”? Why did the Torah need to mention all “you shall not find”? You must destroy that which you can find; that which you cannot find, you need not destroy. From here, you would say that if chametz fell into a cistern and the dogs and pigs can find it and extract it, you must destroy it; if not, you need not destroy it. (Torah Shleimah Shemot 12,19)
The Mechilta DeRashbi here relates a different basis for the prohibition. Chametz that you own can be exempt from the prohibition on ownership if you are unable to retrieve it.
It is important to note that the Mishna in Pesachim 31b discusses a case of chametz that was buried under a landslide. The Mishna rules that chametz is as though destroyed if a dog cannot extract it, in keeping with the Mechilta DeRashbi’s ruling quoted here. The Gemara there notes Rav Chisda’s opinion that one must still nullify the chametz, indicating that even under a landslide it remains subject to the prohibition of ownership (nullification is one way to remove the prohibition). However, Rashi there notes that this requirement is only due to the possibility that the chametz might become uncovered during the festival, thereby risking a violation of the prohibition at that time. The Ramban in his commentary to the Torah (Shemot 12:19) also addresses this Mishna:
Excluded also is the case of an Israelite’s leavened bread buried under great debris where he can’t clear away the ruin, and it is lost to him and everyone. It is permissible since it is no longer called “his.”
Ramban links this exemption to standard monetary laws, not to a specific chametz law. If something cannot be accessed, such as an item swept away by a river, it is no longer someone’s property.
The Meiri on this Mishna states that the requirement to nullify the chametz is dictated by Torah law:
The Meiri said: Chametz that a rockslide fell on, that is to say, before Pesach, is as though it were destroyed since he has no intent to clear the rockslides, and he need not uncover the chametz (to destroy it), and in the Gemara they required him to nullify the chametz in his heart for if he does not nullify it he has transgressed the prohibition of burying chametz (to keep it). (Meiri Pesachim 31b)
It is apparent, then, that the Meiri (at least in this instance) rejects a possible second criterion for the prohibition on owning chametz. Nevertheless, many Rishonim interpret the Mechilta and the Mishna to suggest otherwise in such cases.
Accepting Responsibility (Achrayut)
The question of whether chametz found on your property but not owned by you falls under the prohibition is hinted at by the Mechilta DeRashbi. To further illustrate this issue, consider the following two cases, starting with one that specifically references chametz not owned by the individual:
The Master said: I might have thought one may conceal leaven in one’s home or accept deposits from the gentiles. Therefore, the verse states: It shall not be found. But didn’t you say: Your own leaven you may not see, but you may see others’ leaven and leaven consecrated to God? This is not difficult; in this case, he accepted upon himself monetary responsibility for preserving the leaven. In that case, he did not accept responsibility. This is like that which Rava said to the residents of Meḥoza: Remove the leavened bread that belongs to the members of the gentile army from your houses. If it were stolen or lost, it would remain in your possession, and you would be required to pay for it; its legal status would be as if it were yours, and keeping it during Passover would be prohibited.
This works well, according to the one who said: The legal status of an object that affects monetary loss is like that of money. However, according to the one who said, “The legal status of an object that effects monetary loss is not like that of money,” what can be said? It is different here, as the verse said: “It shall not be found.” (BT Pesachim 5b)
The Gemara outlines a second avenue for violating the chametz prohibitions: not just monetary ownership, but also responsibility for chametz in one’s possession can create liability. This two-pronged approach resurfaces elsewhere, such as:
The Sages taught in a baraita: A gentile who enters the courtyard of a Jew with his dough in his hand, the Jew need not remove the leaven. If the gentile deposited the leaven with him, he must remove it. If he designated a room in his house for the leavened food, he need not remove it, as it is stated: “It shall not be found”. (BT Pesachim 6a)
Rashi says the ban applies only if responsibility for the chametz is accepted, consistent with the earlier Gemara. If a room is designated for the chametz, it is considered in the gentile’s domain, not the Jew’s responsibility.
Interestingly, Tosafot reject Rashi’s understanding:
Rashi explained that the Jew did not accept responsibility; he said, “This house is for you”. And this is difficult for Ri, for why does it say that he designated the house? Even if he did not designate it, there would still be no violation… And Rabbeinu Tam explained that even if he accepted responsibility, the designation worked, and that is why the exemption stems from “it shall not be found,” for it is not considered findable since a house was designated… (Tosafot Pesachim 6a)
Tosafot’s position on chametz under one’s responsibility focuses on whether it is considered “found.” If not, the prohibition is not triggered. Thus, Tosafot identify two independent aspects to the prohibition: monetary ownership of chametz, or responsibility and it being considered “found.”
The Rented House: A Case Study
The Chayei Adam in 119:18 makes the following comment:
And it seems obvious to me that, according to our custom, where we sell the room with the chametz placed in it (to a non-Jew), the homeowner is at least obligated to check, since the non-Jew has not taken possession of it. It is also obvious that, according to all opinions, if the key is still in the homeowner’s possession, the homeowner is obligated to check (see Chok Yaakov Siman 437, sub-paragraph 2). This is because we do not hand over the deed and the key to the non-Jew until the 14th, and therefore, the obligation to check falls upon the homeowner immediately the night before.
The Chok Yaakov there quotes the Ran. The Ran in question says the following (Pesachim 4a):
…just as land is bought with coins, a bill of sale, or by taking possession directly (chazaka), so too a lease of land can be effectuated with coins, a bill of sale, or chazaka, and even so, the rule is dependent on giving over the keys (not the formal sale) since there is reason to obligate the landlord as it is his house and his chametz and there is also reason to obligate the renter for now it is in his possession, giving over the keys is determinative (of the obligation to destroy the chametz).
Once again, the Ran (and the Chayei Adam as a matter of practical halacha) is ruling that the obligation to destroy chametz is dependent on two factors: the ownership of the chametz in question and its being in your possession (unless exempted on account of non-Jewish or sacral ownership). This seems to be in accord with the Tosafot opinion quoted above.
The Dual Requirement: Ramban and Rabbeinu David
A third possibility for understanding this prohibition is the Ramban’s view. The Ramban states in relation to the ownership of chametz:
We have learnt from here (the law regarding a gentile who brought chametz into the house of a Jew) that the rule of chametz on a Jew is the same as that of a non-Jew, where the Jew accepted on himself responsibility for the chametz, and for both of them if they are in the possession of the Jew, he transgresses. If they are in the possession of the non-Jew, he does not transgress, for it says “your houses”. And this is obvious for if you do not say so, you must say that your chametz, even if in the possession of a gentile in the city, you transgress through your ownership and even though it is not in your house or your property, and chametz which is not yours, even in your house, you do not transgress, and the Torah said: “your domain” and “your houses”. (Ramban Pesachim 6a)
The Ramban is distinct from Tosafot and the Ran in that he holds that there are two necessary conditions to transgress the prohibition on owning chametz: it must be both yours and in your possession during Pesach. Tosafot and Ran hold that either of these is sufficient on their own without the other, and Rambam holds that only ownership is sufficient.
All the discussion to this point has distinguished between chametz owned by a Jew and that owned by a gentile. A Jew’s chametz is forbidden, even when in the possession of a different Jew. Most Rishonim subscribe to this opinion. For example, Rambam states (in the same halacha quoted above):
[From the above,] you can learn that chametz belonging to a Jew which was left in his possession, even though it is buried, is located in another city, or is entrusted to a gentile, causes him to violate [the commandments]: “[leaven] shall not be seen” and “[leaven] shall not be found.” (Rambam Chametz uMatzah 4:2)
Similarly, Rashi states:
Since it says: “it shall not be seen by you” - since it is written “to you”, this implies that you may not see your chametz, but you can see outside of your house chametz belonging to others, such as gentiles and sacral chametz. (Pesachim 5b)
Both Rashi and Rambam assume that the problem of chametz being found in your property extends to chametz owned by other Jews. Rabbeinu David disagrees:
And when they said: “and you may see the chametz of others or of the one on high” - you may also exclude based on this the chametz of (other) Jews (Rabbeinu David 4a)
Rabbeinu David applies this opinion to the discussion mentioned above with regard to a rented house, and comes to the conclusion that even if the house were to be owned by a Jew and rented to a Jew with chametz inside, neither transgresses the prohibition on owning chametz:
And the truth is, no one transgresses with this chametz… not the landlord and not the renter; this one because it is not his (the renter’s), and this one because it is not in his possession (the landlord’s). (Rabbeinu David Pesachim 4a)
We can see here that Rabbeinu David adopts the Ramban’s understanding that there are two conditions precedent to the prohibition on owning chametz on Pesach.
The Three-Way Dispute
Accordingly, we can see that the Rishonim divide in three ways in understanding the prohibition on owning chametz on Pesach:
Rambam, Meiri - it depends on monetary ownership.
Tosafot, Ran - the prohibition can be violated either through monetary ownership or through having chametz you do not own in your possession.
Ramban, Rabbeinu David - the prohibition is contravened only if you both own the chametz and have it in your possession over Pesach.
It is my hope that this is learnt both in the spirit of the halacha to learn about the festival during the festival, and that it enriches and adds colour to our understanding of our deep aversion to chametz on Pesach.


